Apparently Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of Justice by Feldman, Heidi Li
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 6 
1999 
Apparently Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of 
Justice 
Heidi Li Feldman 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heidi L. Feldman, Apparently Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of Justice, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1472 (1999). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol97/iss6/12 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
APPARENTLY SUBSTANTIAL, ODDLY 
HOLLOW: THE ENIGMATIC 
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 
Heidi Li Feldman* 
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS. By 
William H. Simon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. 
Pp. 253. $35. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics, by William 
H. Simon, 1 is one of the most thoughtful and important books in 
legal theory - not just legal ethics - published in the past ten 
years. Like David Luban's seminal contribution to legal ethics, 
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study, 2 published a decade ago, 
Simon's book is a deliberate rival to accounts of lawyers' profes­
sional responsibility that begin with a command to zealous advo­
cacy, end with a prohibition on outright illegal conduct, and offer 
nothing in between. Authors and commentators have grown in­
creasingly dissatisfied with this as the basic structure of legal ethics,3 
but to date, no alternative model has gained widespread endorse­
ment. Other than Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer and 
Luban's Lawyers and Justice, I know of no other full-scale attempt 
to develop a profession-wide alternative to the all-zeal/no­
unlawfulness model. We need as many serious attempts as possible 
if those of us interested in legal ethics are to fashion an enduring, 
plausible theory of how lawyers should act and who they should be. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1982, Brown; 
J.D. 1990, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan. -Ed. The author thanks John 
Hynes for his assistance in preparing this piece and David Luban and Robin West for reading 
and reacting to it and for sharing their own reviews of The Practice of Justice. 
1. Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law 
School. 
2. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETiiICAL STUDY (1988). 
3. See, e.g., ANTiioNY T. KRoNMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF A LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1993); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1 
(1988); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991); David 
Luban, Stevens's Professionalism and Ours, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 297 (1996); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural 
World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 
HARV. L. REv. 468 (1990); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 169 (1997). Although they are motivated by different concerns, each of these 
authors discusses the shortcomings of the zealous advocacy model and argues that it cannot 
serve as a complete or compelling theory of legal ethics. 
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Each worthy effort teaches us what we should or should not include 
in such a theory, even if we do not wholly adopt the author's propo­
sal. Lawyers and Justice taught that we should be suspicious of a 
legal ethics founded on role morality. The Lost Lawyer focused at­
tention on the centrality of high quality practical reasoning in good 
lawyering. William H. Simon's The Practice of Justice reminds us to 
mine the rich resources of jurisp.i;udence when building a solid the­
ory of legal ethics, and to watch out if we ignore the jurisprudential 
foundations upon which our theory rests. 
Simon skillfully and persuasively criticizes what he calls the 
"Dominant View" of legal ethics, by revealing the inadequacies of 
its jurisprudence.4 According to the Dominant View, which is a va­
riety of the all-zeal/no-unlawfulness model, "the lawyer must - or 
at least may - pursue any goal of the client through any arguably 
legal course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim" (p. 
7). Simon demonstrates the Dominant View's dependence upon 
formalist commitments to libertarianism and legal positivism. 
Then, he undermines these commitments, clearing the way for 
Simon's preferred theory of legal ethics, the Contextual View, 
which holds that "the lawyer should take such actions as, consider­
ing the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to 
promote justice" (p. 9). Unfortunately, the Contextual View suffers 
from some serious problems, difficulties that become particularly 
apparent when we imagine putting the Contextual View into prac­
tice. An oddity of The Practice of Justice is that the flaws in Simon's 
positive account of legal ethics seem to be ones he should have eas­
ily spotted. As I will argue below, Simon overlooks a normative 
vacuum in his theory. Since his critique of the Dominant View 
reveals its inadequacy if we do not accept its normative engine, lib­
ertarianism, one might have expected Simon to make sure his own 
account possessed a plausible, workable source of normativity. 
Simon presents the Contextual View as if justice will fill this role. 
But as Simon construes justice, it cannot play the part. 
The shortcomings in Simon's approach to justice relate to a 
more general flaw in Simon's approach to ethics. Simon seems 
insensitive to the idea that ethical requirements should be instruc­
tive, compelling, and authoritative. Immanuel Kant's ethics high­
light this sort of categoricity, which insists that ethical requirements 
are nonoptional and do not vary according to personal interpreta-
4. Simon also rejects the "Public Interest View," which he claims urges that "law should 
be applied in accordance with its purposes, and litigation should be conducted so as to pro­
mote informed resolution on the substantive merits." P. 8. But his main target is the 
Dominant View, and I restrict my discussion to Simon's critique of it and his advancement of 
the Contextual View. 
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tion.5 Simon objects strenuously to a different sort of categoricity 
- a tendency to conceive ethical demands unduly broadly, without 
nuance (p. 9). But in his zeal to condemn this sort of categoricity, 
he overlooks Kantian categoricity entirely. Simon's conception of 
justice strips that value of much of its normative power. Simon's 
blindness to Kantian categoricity makes it seem that he envisions a 
lawyers' ethics without normative authority of any kind. 
THE FAILINGS OF THE DOMINANT VIEW 
Perceptively and adroitly, Simon demonstrates that in its blend 
of libertarianism and legal positivism, the Dominant View is a 
throwback to an earlier school of legal thought, sometimes called 
formalism and, sometimes, Classical Legal Thought.6 Epitomized 
in Lochner v. New York, 7 classical formalism imported the liberta­
rian conception of freedom as protection from unwarranted en­
croachments by the state or by other individuals. According to 
libertarianism, the state or other people are only justified in inter­
fering with an individual's pursuit of her own ends if she consents to 
the interference, or if in her pursuit she interferes with others' like 
pursuit without their consent. In addition to its libertarianism, 
classical formalism included a form of legal positivism, conceiving 
of law as both conceptually and substantively independent of other 
social, political, and intellectual realms. Formalist judges wrote as if 
the content and application of precedent cases were transparent 
and self-evident. These jurists did not overtly consult or invoke 
moral, political, economic, and historical facts or theories to justify 
their interpretations of the law. For classical formalists, interpreta­
tion, like the law itself, was obvious. 
5. See lMMANuEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF TiiE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 76 (H.J. 
Paton trans., 1948) (1785) ("Unless we wish to deny to the concept of morality all truth and 
all relation to a possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is of such widespread signifi­
cance as to hold, not merely for men, but for all rational beings as such - not merely subject 
to contingent conditions and exceptions, but with absolute necessity."). Ludwig Wittgenstein 
assumed ethics possessed this sort of absolute quality, and he argued that this implies that 
ethics must be independent of matters of fact. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lecture on Ethics," 
in STEPHEN DARWALL ET AL., MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 65, 66-68 (1997). Philippa 
Foot has famously argued against the need for or presence of Kantian categoricity in ethics. 
See generally Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, in VIRTUES 
AND VICES 157 (1978). John McDowell argues against Foot's conclusion that moral impera· 
tives are hypothetical, while at the same time offering an alternative categoricity to that of 
Kantian ethics. John McDowell, I. Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?, 52 
PROCEEDINGS OF TiiE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 13, 13 (1978). 
6. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870· 
1960, at 10 (1992); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. P1rr. L. REv. 1, 2 n.6 
(1983); Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and the 
Transformation of the Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1119, 1122-24 
(1995); Duncan Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The 
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3 (1980). 
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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Although American classical formalism did not include an ac­
count of legal ethics, Simon is dead right when he claims that the 
Dominant View of legal ethics is the account that follows from 
classical formalism (p. 28). The Dominant View instructs the law­
yer that she may or must pursue the client's interests via any argua­
bly legal course of action. The law by itself sets the only limit on 
what the lawyer may do. David Wilkins, another current and im­
portant legal ethicist, presents this as "the boundary claim."S Like 
Simon, Wilkins observes that this image of the law as boundary­
setting relies on a sense of the law as an external force, exerting 
influence on the lawyer independent of her own or anybody else's 
moral, political, economic, or historical views. 9 This is the formalist 
vision of law's separateness. Under the Dominant View, the lawyer 
barricades the client's rightful sphere of autonomy by pressing the 
client's lawful claims. Since the law itself is not moral, political, or 
economic, the lawyer is not aiding the client in any illegitimate im­
position on anybody else's freedom; but anything short of pressing 
to the boundaries of the law would mean that the lawyer is illegiti­
mately imposing her own views on the client. The lawyer facilitates 
the client's freedom as per the libertarianism of classical formalism. 
Simon rejects both the libertarianism and the legal positivism of 
classical formalism. He faults libertarianism for its cramped con­
ception of freedom and its elevation of this form of freedom over 
all other moral goods (p. 36). Simon rejects legal positivism be­
cause it cannot sustain the strong law/nonlaw distinction it draws (p. 
37). Simon's attack draws heavily on jurisprudential ideas ad­
vanced by Ronald Dworkin and by Critical Legal Studies scholars, 
debts Simon acknowledges heartily (p. 247). The key premise of his 
argument is that it is impossible to interpret the law, and therefore 
to identify it, without incorporating moral, political, and economic 
values into one's assessment. These values, however, do not stem 
from a sovereign's enactment, one feature positivism relies upon to 
distinguish law from nonlaw (pp. 38-39). Simon advances other ar­
guments against legal positivism, but this is the main one, and it is 
convincing.10 
THE NORMATIVITY AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE OF ROBUST 
ETHICAL THEORY 
As the subtitle of The Practice of Justice tells us, Simon offers a 
theory of lawyers' ethics. Simon insightfully draws our attention to 
8. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468, 471 (1990). 
9. See id. at 472. 
10. For a fuller and quite helpful discussion of Simon's Dworkinian arguments against 
legal positivism, see Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal 
World, 61 Stan L. Rev. 973, 977-79 (1999). 
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the fact that such a theory can rely upon jurisprudence - philoso­
phy of law - as well as moral and political philosophy. He does 
this by showing how the Dominant View generates its normative 
ethics - its basic tenet of how a lawyer ought, morally, to behave 
- from its jurisprudence (libertarianism plus legal positivism). 
And his own strategy for generating an alternative normative ethics 
for lawyers depends primarily on substituting a different jurispru­
dence for the one implicit in the Dominant View. The key difficulty 
here, however, is that a jurisprudence without a robust moral phi­
losophy cannot effectively guide ethical conduct. A robust moral 
philosophy is not necessarily a correct moral theory, but it has at 
least two features: (at least minimally) plausible accounts of (i) the 
source of moral normativity and (ii) what counts as an appropriate 
response to this normative source. 
The Dorii nant View relies on libertarianism as its robust moral 
philosophy, a point Simon himself makes. In libertarianism, the 
source of moral normativity is the individual. Responding to the 
normativity of the individual calls for leaving her free to choose and 
act as she pleases. Other major moral theories offer alternative 
sources of moral normativity. In Kantianism, the source is the 
moral law itself; we respond properly to this normative source by 
exercising pure practical reason to figure out exactly what it calls 
for us to do in any particular situation.11 According to utilitarian­
ism, the good - in the form of human happiness - is the source of 
normativity, and it bids us to act so as to maximize its existence.12 
In classic virtue theory, human telos or purpose supplies normativ­
ity, and we acknowledge this source appropriately by shaping our 
characters so as to fulfill our telos.13 
People's reactions to the plausibility of each theory's source of 
normativity vary; even among those who endorse the same source, 
debate arises over exactly what strategies and tactics constitute cor­
rect responses. But Kantianism, utilitarianism, and virtue theory -
and, to a lesser degree, libertarianism - have identified sufficiently 
believable sources of normativity and made adequate recommenda­
tions about the right response to these sources to gain adherents 
and expositors. If Simon's Contextual View is to qualify as an eth-
11. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRAcnCAL REASON 35-36, 87 (H.W. Cassirer 
trans., Marquette Univ. Press 1998) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE MET­
APHYSICS OF MORALS 12-14 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publg. Co. 1981) (1785); see 
also LEWIS WHITE BECK, A COMMENTARY ON KANT's CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL R£4son219 
(1960); CHRISTINE M. KoRSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 77 (1996). 
12. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCflON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 11-16 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Athlone Press 1970) 
(1789); JoHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTA· 
TIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 8 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1861). 
13. See ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WoRKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 942-
43 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., Random House 1941). 
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ics, even if only an ethics for lawyers, it has to identify a source of 
normativity and indicate what counts as the right sort of response to 
that source. If the Contextual View is to hold any promise, both 
source and response have to be at least minimally plausible. 
According to the Contextual View of lawyers' ethics, "lawyers 
should take those actions that, considering the relevant circum­
stances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice" (p. 
138). The Contextual View defines justice as the "basic values of 
the legal system," and it "subsumes many layers of more concrete 
norms" (p. 138). In short, justice is equivalent to legal merit (p. 
138). Before analyzing the ethical aspects of this view, let us 
examine its jurisprudence. 
Instead of a formalist theory of interpretation, according to 
which the meaning of legal rules and standards is transparently 
available from an examination of precedent, Simon adopts a sub­
stantive, purposivist theory, according to which the meaning of 
legal rules and standards is not evident simply from textual exami­
nation but must be ascertained in light of the basic values and goals 
of the legal system (p. 82). Because these goals and values include 
moral components, law cannot be walled off from morality (p. 85). 
Without reference to the morality incorporated into the law's basic 
values, we cannot even identify what the law is. Simon calls this a 
substantive conception of the law (p. 82). Substantive conceptions 
come in many stripes, depending upon what one takes the law's 
basic values to be. Simon mentions natural law, libertarianism, util­
itarianism, wealth-maximization, Rawlsianism, virtue theories, and 
Dworkinian coherentism as substantive conceptions of American 
law (p. 82). 
Simon's purposivist jurisprudence includes a metaphysics - a 
theory of what the law is - and an epistemology - a theory of 
how we should identify what the law is. Metaphysically, the law is 
infused with moral, political, and economic values. Epistemologi­
cally, we should consider these values in our efforts to decide what 
the law is, means, and requires of us. Simon's metaphysics and 
epistemology of law are mutually supporting. The reason we 
cannot readily know the law without making reference to its basic 
values is because the law does not exist apart from its basic values. 
Correlatively, because the law has built into it basic values, we 
cannot easily identify the law unless we appreciate its basic values. 
The relationship between what the law is and how we know the law 
is not one of logical connection or conceptual constitutiveness. In 
principle, we could have an interpretive method that would enable 
us to identify the law without ever considering, acknowledging, or 
noticing the law's basic values, or even postulating that it has any, 
even if the law itself consists of moral and political values in part. 
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Likewise, we could use a method that supposes and considers basic 
values to identify the law even if, as it turned out, the law itself does 
not include any basic values. But, pragmatically speaking, if our 
best theory of legal interpretation instructs us to consider basic val­
ues that seem to be part of the law and if our best understanding of 
what law is includes basic values, then each of these recommends 
the other. In other words, if the substantivist's metaphysics of the 
law holds, his interpretive method promises to be helpful; and if his 
interpretive method proves helpful, this bolsters his metaphysical 
claims. 
Simon's account of substantive conceptions of law makes the 
Dominant View's jurisprudence into a closet substantive view. 
Since the Dominant View relies on a libertarian morality to expli­
cate and justify both zealous advocacy and its legal limits, the 
Dominant View deviates from its own commitment to legal positiv­
ism (p. 43). Simon's argument allows us to extend to legal ethics 
the observation that, appearances notwithstanding, law is morally 
and politically value-laden - an observation made by legal realists 
and their intellectual descendants. 
It follows from Simon's own critique of formalism that any 
theory that ties lawyers' ethics to the law is ultimately going to have 
to put something in the placeholder occupied by libertarianism in 
the Dominant View. If substantivism about law is right, then any 
ethical theory that requires lawyers to interpret or identify the law 
will have to take a position on the fundamental values that are part 
of the law on a substantivist view, or it will have to delegate respon­
sibility for ascertaining those values to some other theory or author­
ity and justify this assignment. Simon seems to choose the second 
path. Simon does not offer an extended account of the moral and 
political content of the law. Instead, he claims that the law's funda­
mental purpose is justice and he equates justice with legal merit. 
This allows him to argue that anybody able to reason accurately 
about justice or legal merit is an appropriate delegate for the task of 
filling in the law's substantive moral and political content (p. 51). 
Since lawyers are trained to reason about legal merit - if not jus­
tice - they are especially suited for the job. 
By equating justice with legal merit, Simon could mean that 
whatever legal positions hold water under our actual legal rules and 
standards are consistent with justice. Or he could mean that 
whenever our legal rules and standards appear to permit positions 
inconsistent with the requirements of justice (as understood in­
dependent of the apparent legal merits), we have misunderstood 
the law and must correct our identification of legal merit. This de­
scriptive equation of legal merit and justice is blatantly false. It 
cannot be that whatever our current law permits always coincides 
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with or constitutes justice. At any given moment in history, the law 
permits activities that run counter to our best and most deeply held 
ideas about justice. Examples of divergence abound. A tort regime 
that made it virtually impossible for injured, relatively poor workers 
to recover any damages from their negligent, relatively wealthy 
employers did not even comport with contemporary views about 
justice.14 A constitutional law that allowed, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, race-based segregation struck even contemporary par­
ticipants as unjust.1s 
It isn't that on occasion our ideas about justice could turn out to 
be wrong and the law's permissions just; it's that it seems utterly 
absurd to suppose that this could be the case on every occasion 
where law and justice seem to conflict. Most of the time, Simon 
himself appreciates the absurdity of the strong descriptive equation. 
Hence, he devotes a large portion of the book to justifying nullifica­
tion, which he argues is not really nullification but, when done 
rightly, is correction of a misunderstanding of what the law is (pp. 
86-98). If legal merit equals justice, and seemingly legal conduct is 
actually unjust, then nullification serves to realign law and justice, 
thereby replacing inauthentic law with the genuine article. Setting 
aside the worry that this conception of nullification makes it impos­
sible to ever say that there is unjust law - because it seems that on 
this approach if putative law is unjust it is not really law - this 
conception of nullification presents a particular problem for 
Simon's Contextual View. 
Remember: Simon maintains that lawyers are especially suita­
ble delegates for the task of ascertaining the moral content of the 
law, because they are trained to identify positions with legal merit. 
But if genuine legal merit depends on an accurate understanding of 
justice, then lawyers are only especially good delegates if they are 
especially good at judging justice. Legal training could only make 
one especially good at this if the legal system in which one was 
trained did in fact overlap extensively with the requirements of jus­
tice, or if the style of legal thinking one learned was a style that was 
either the same as, or a useful contributor to, good reasoning about 
justice. I have already explained why we should seriously doubt 
that our current legal system overlaps justice thoroughly enough to 
assume that those well acquainted with the law are thereby well 
14. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECilNG SOLDIERS AND MoTIIERS: THE PoLmCAL 
ORIGINS OF SocIAL PouCY IN TIIE UNITED STATES 286-302 (1992) (describing the co=on 
law doctrines preventing recovery: judicial and legislative efforts to modify these doctrines, 
which were only moderately successful; and the tepid administrative schemes meant to rem­
edy the problem of workplace injury). 
15. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-64 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Justice Harlan arguing, in dissent, that Louisiana's race-based 
segregation laws were inconsistent with both guarantees of liberty and equality). 
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acquainted with justice. As for whether those skilled in legal analy­
sis are thereby skilled in judging justice, at minimum, this is an open 
question. First, there is the issue of whether a method of thought 
learned with regard to a domain (law) that most probably deviates 
from justice at least sometimes is likely to be useful for reaching 
accurate conclusions about justice. Second, there is the problem 
that motivates Simon's book in the first place. Many lawyers seem 
to feel that what their jobs require of them is, at worst, inconsistent 
with justice and, at best, irrelevant to it (p. 1). They do not qualify 
this observation with the caveat that when they are engaged in pure 
legal deliberation - as opposed to, say, rainmaking or document 
handling - then they sense a convergence between lawyering and 
deliberating well about justice. This suggests that those most 
engaged in the practice of legal reasoning do not perceive them­
selves as especially well suited to the task of identifying the require­
ments of justice - the task the Contextual View assigns them. 
Simon does not actually bluntly tell lawyers to figure out the just 
outcome in each matter in which they participate and then act ac­
cordingly. He recommends procedural guidelines to assist lawyers 
in deciding what justice requires of them in any given situation. 
Simon suggests these guidelines as antidotes to three tensions he 
claims recur in legal ethics problems (p. 139). One is the tension 
between substance and procedure, which "arises from the lawyer's 
sense, on the one hand, of the limitations of her judgment regarding 
the substantive merit of a matter and, on the other hand, of the 
limitations of the established procedures for determining the mat­
ter" (p. 139). Another is the tension between purpose and form, 
which arises because a lawyer deciding how she ought to act under 
the law can concentrate on the purely formal features of a legal rule 
or principle, or she can consider the purposes that underlie these 
features (pp. 144-45). Because formal and purposive interpreta­
tions of the same law do not always dictate the same conduct, the 
lawyer must mediate between the two when deciding what to do. 
The third tension is between broad framing and narrow framing. 
As Simon uses the term, framing is the description of the issue at 
hand (p. 149). Often, an issue and its resolution will look different 
depending upon whether we frame the issue with a few characteris­
tics of the situation or with many (p. 149). 
For each tension, Simon suggests a guideline for resolving it in 
particular situations: 
(I) To mediate between substance and procedure, the lawyer 
should ask herself whether she can count on the relevant 
procedures to achieve the correct substantive outcome. 
"[T]he more reliable the relevant procedures and institu­
tions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need assume 
for the substantive justice of the resolution . . .  " (p. 140). 
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(II) To reconcile form and purpose, the attorney should weigh 
the clarity and significance of the purpose against the for­
mulaic requirements of the law. "[T]he clearer and more 
fundamental the relevant purposes, the more the lawyer 
should consider herself bound by them; the less clear and 
more problematic the relevant purposes, the more justified 
the lawyer is in treating the relevant norms formally" (pp. 
145-46). 
(III) To decide which characteristics to include in her framing of 
an issue, the lawyer should respect three standards of rele­
vance: (i) A consideration should be included in the frame 
if it fits the most plausible interpretation of a law's scope. If 
a law regulates narrowly, a lawyer should frame the issues 
that arise under it narrowly; if the law regulates broadly, the 
lawyer should frame it broadly (pp. 150-51); (ii) If a consid­
eration is likely to have substantive practical influence on 
the resolution of a matter, then it should be included in the 
frame of the issue (p. 151); (iii) If a lawyer cannot compe­
tently handle an issue framed broadly - due, perhaps to 
limitations on her knowledge, skill, or resources - she 
should frame the issue more narrowly (p. 151). 
These guidelines and the interrelationships between them raise 
myriad issues. Whatever else we may say about them, one thing is 
certain: they do not provide a lawyer with a substantive account of 
justice. Yet the first guideline - counseling a lawyer to deviate 
from unreliable procedures to achieve substantive justice - clearly 
presupposes that the lawyer can locate a substantive account. She 
needs contentful principles of justice to assess the overall reliability 
of the relevant procedures and institutions (do they usually achieve 
just results?) and to decide whether to trust these procedures and 
institutions in the instant matter (how likely is it that they will 
achieve the just result this time?). 
The other two guidelines also presuppose that the lawyer pos­
sesses at least some features of a substantive account of justice. Ac­
cording to the second guideline, a lawyer should treat the law 
formulaically only to the degree that its substantive purposes are 
unclear. If we accept Simon's central jurisprudential assertion -
that the law's fundamental substantive purpose is justice - then we 
have to accept that lawyers need to know something about the con­
tent of justice to judge when to interpret law more purposively, less 
formally. Simon never claims that every law's only purpose is jus­
tice, so it would not be right to say that the second guideline only 
has impact if a lawyer has a complete account of substantive justice 
in hand. The balance between purposive and formalistic interpreta­
tion could be struck according to the clarity and significance of a 
law's purposes other than justice. Nevertheless, because justice is 
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the most fundamental purpose of all law, according to Simon, un­
certainty about substantive justice will always tilt the balance to­
ward formalistic treatment - an odd result for a theory motivated 
by a rejection of formalism in legal interpretation. 
The third guideline also implicates substantive justice. This 
guideline specifies three criteria of relevance to which a lawyer 
should refer when framing an ethical problem. The first standard of 
relevance says that the broadness or narrowness of frames should 
vary with the broadness or narrowness of the scope of the law 
involved in the problem. Ascertaining the scope of a law, however, 
generally requires understanding its purpose or animating values 
(again, a lesson of American Legal Realism, reiterated by contem­
porary scholarly descendants of that movement). If justice is al­
ways one of the purposes or basic values informing a law, an 
attorney cannot settle the scope of the law without some substan­
tive conception of justice, and the way the law in question relates to 
achieving substantive justice. The second standard of relevance 
looks to the empirical difference a variation in frame would make 
to the resolution of the issue. Shifting the frame might prompt a 
lawyer to consider different laws possibly applicable to the situa­
tion. This potentiality could quickly push the lawyer into having to 
analyze the purpose, meaning, or reach of different laws in order to 
decide which ones apply under which frames. Once a lawyer must 
engage in this analysis she needs - again, according to Simon's 
view of the law - a substantive conception of justice. The third 
standard of relevance does not presuppose that a lawyer referring 
to it has a substantive conception of justice in mind. But it does 
seem to presuppose some substantive ideas about justice that Si­
mon apparently holds but does not defend. This third standard di­
rects a lawyer to narrow the frame of an ethical problem according 
to shortfalls in her knowledge or competence that would make it 
difficult to resolve the problem if it was framed more broadly. I do 
not find this advice intuitively compelling. It seems to tell a lawyer 
that it is always better to stick to her knitting in the face of uncer­
tainty and scarce resources, rather than risk acknowledging a more 
serious ethical problem and bungling it. But this advice is only ap­
pealing if we think that lawyers should be consistently risk averse 
about attempting to achieve justice when their own knowledge and 
competence is limited. At first glance, this proposition does not 
seem obviously correct. It seems to depend upon a further claim 
about the relative merits of ambitious but botched ethical problem­
solving versus a potential sacrifice of justice. Perhaps it also relies 
on a claim about the likelihood of bungling in the face of uncer­
tainty and scarce resources. The first of these two claims is clearly a 
substantive moral claim that may belong within a substantive 
theory of justice, yet it is not a claim that Simon defends. 
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I do not fault Simon for propounding a theory of lawyers' ethics 
that a lawyer cannot use unless she possesses a substantive concep­
tion of justice. But a lawyer acting under the Contextual View will 
have to arrive at a substantive conception of justice somehow. 
Simon seems untroubled by this. Yet he ought to be concerned. It 
is hard to develop an acceptable - let alone a correct - concep­
tion of justice. Even if an attorney does not start from scratch, but 
instead decides to adopt a conception of justice from an established 
philosophical or religious tradition, it will be hard for her to select 
wisely and with full appreciation of an established conception's 
content. 
Of course, this picture of an individual attorney surveying estab­
lished conceptions of justice or carefully developing her own is 
rather fanciful, in any event. An attorney who approaches ethical 
problems according to the Contextual View is unlikely to have the 
time or training to select or work out a substantive conception of 
justice. She is much more likely to consult her intuitions about jus­
tice on a case by case basis. This scenario raises concerns about the 
soundness of the Contextual View when put into practice. 
There are several potential pitfalls for an ethical regime that de­
pends on decisionmakers unsystematically consulting their intu­
itions for its success. The decisions of such actors will only be as 
sound as their ethical intuitions. But one key motivation for devel­
oping any theory of ethics, including a theory of lawyers' ethics, is 
doubt about the soundness of decisionmakers' pre-philosophical in­
tuitions. Such doubt becomes especially acute in contexts where a 
decisionmaker's instincts about justice might be distorted by self­
interest or other morally irrelevant factors. Practicing attorneys op­
erate in such a context. Both their livelihoods and their profes­
sional relationships can depend upon decisions they make about 
ethical problems. When one's position, income, or friendships can 
tum on one's ethical choices, it is hard to trust, and perhaps even to 
know, one's intuitions about justice. 
CATEGORICAL PRECEPTS AND THE PROBLEM OF 
SPECIAL PLEADING 
The Contextual View does not necessarily restrict an attorney to 
her own intuitions about justice as she decides what to do about an 
ethical problem. But Simon's absolute resistance to what he calls 
the "categorical" seems to inhibit him from advocating any more 
systematic conception of justice. Equally, it seeins to lead him to 
oppose any ethical theory that concentrates on developing the 
outlook of lawyers so that we might have more confidence in the 
soundness of their untutored intuitions about justice. 
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Simon describes categorical decisionmaking and categorical 
norms as follows: 
[B]oth the Dominant and the Public Interest views, for all the differ­
ences in their priorities, adopt a common style of decisionmaking that 
I call categorical. Such decisionmaking severely restricts the range of 
considerations the decisionmaker may take into account when she 
confronts a particular problem; a rigid rule dictates a particular re­
sponse in the presence of a small number of factors. The deci­
sionmaker has no discretion to consider factors that are not specified 
or to evaluate specified factors in ways other than those prescribed by 
the rule. [p. 9] 
Categorical norms - like the all-but-absolute confidentiality guaran­
tee and the Dominant View's general "arguably legal" norm - re­
quire simpler judgments based on a narrower range of factual 
considerations than do contextual norms. [pp. 69-70] 
Simon also writes that "categorical norms require less demand­
ing interpretive efforts than contextual ones" (p. 74); he claims that 
the legal "profession has promulgated an ideology, backed by disci­
plinary rules and sanctions, that mandates unreflective, mechanical, 
categorical judgment rather than practical reason" (p. 23; emphasis 
added). Simon argues that popular films such as The Talk of the 
Town and The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance reveal the stunted 
psyches of those lawyers "disposed to . . .  categorical normative 
judgment" (p. 94). On Simon's interpretation, both films' main 
characters "exemplify rigidity associated with limited experience of 
the world. . . . Their rigidity takes two forms that the movies treat 
as analogous. One is sexual: they are awkward with women. The 
other is intellectual . . . . Their reverence for the law is sanctimoni­
ous and naYve" (p. 94). Simon adds: 
[T]he movies see the disposition toward categorical judgment as a 
form of emotional and intellectual maturity. In this condition, people 
deny or shield themselves from the real world because they are afraid 
of its complexities and contradictions. Maturity involves acknowledg­
ing these complexities and contradictions by abandoning categorical 
normative judgment without becoming cynical. [p. 95] 
All in all, Simon paints a complex picture of categoricity. It 
involves exceptionless rules that specify the circumstances of their 
own applicability. Somebody following such rules need not and 
may not exercise judgment about their applicability when the speci­
fied circumstances obtain. It conjures up timidity and immaturity 
analogous to - perhaps even connected to - sexual naivete. 
This is a somewhat idiosyncratic take on categoricity as a fea­
ture of ethical maxims. Kant famously introduced categoricity as a 
distinguishing feature of moral imperatives. But Kantian ethics cer­
tainly does not dismiss judgment from ethical thinking; Kant de­
votes careful attention to the nature and role of judgment in 
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practical reasoning.16 The categoricity Kant has in mind is not 
about rules having no exceptions or the irrelevance of the particular 
circumstances in which the agent applies them, it is about the 
nonexceptionalness of rational agents. That is, on a Kantian view, 
categorical maxims apply to all rational agents regardless of 
whatever else is true about them. A maxim may be finely honed to 
the particularities of a situation, but if it is the sort of maxim that 
applies to all rational agents and you are one such agent, then the 
maxim applies to you. Applicability in this sense means something 
quite specific. It means that the maxim is authoritative: you uncon­
ditionally ought to follow it. 
I do not wholly embrace Kantian ethics. Even current neo­
Kantian moral philosophers recognize Kant's obscurity when it 
comes to articulating maxims and testing them for universal­
izability.17 But these problems do not arise because of categoricity, 
in either Kant's or Simon's sense of the term. The fact that it is 
hard to judge what maxim applies to a situation or whether a 
maxim can be universalized without contradiction is completely 
separate from the maxim's authority (Kant) or context-insensitivity 
(Simon). Those who defend the unconditional authority of moral 
imperatives need not hold that these imperatives are easily ascer­
tained or applied, nor that they must be couched in highly general 
terms. The sort of categoricity Kantians have in mind is neither 
oversimplistic rigidity nor blushing naivete. 
Simon himself never claims that the sort of categoricity he 
opposes is the Kantian sort. I have explained the difference 
between the two types of categoricity because I believe that Simon 
overlooks Kantian categoricity, perhaps due to his fervent hostility 
to the sort of categoricity he sees in the Dominant View. His un­
derstandable resistance to rigorous, simple-minded, ethical precepts 
seems to blind Simon to the need for normativity and specific gui­
dance in a theory of practical ethics. Recall that Simon seems 
willing to trust individual intuitions about justice to guide attorneys 
deciding ethical problems. Before, I raised some general doubts 
about the reliability of such intuitions in that setting. Our examina­
tion of Kantian categoricity points to a further problem with this 
delegation of normative authority. 
16. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JunGMEITT 15-17 (J.H. Bernard trans., Hafner 
Publg. Co. 1957) (1788); KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REAsoN, supra note 10, at 81-86 
(discussing the operation of pure practical judgment); see also BECK, supra note 10, at 154-63 
(explaining Kant's account of judgment in the Critique of Practical Reason). 
17. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MoRAL JunGMEITT 132 (1993) (noting 
"endless discussion about how or whether the [categorical imperative] works"); ONoRA 
O'NEILL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE: AN EssAY ON KANrrAN ETHICS 41, 53-91 (1975) (discuss­
ing how to apply the categorical imperative). 
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Kantian categoricity prohibits ethical exceptionalism. It denies 
the special pleading people are so tempted to use to justify their 
own departures from moral standards they themselves would 
regard as operative. By delegating to individual intuition the job of 
identifying justice and its requirements, Simon invites just this kind 
of special pleading from lawyers facing ethical problems. If the 
point of the Contextual View is to license and encourage lawyers to 
respond to justice rather than to unduly rigid ethical precepts, the 
advocate of the Contextual View should take a substantive stand on 
justice. Otherwise, a system of hard and fast precepts might seem 
compelling, especially if such precepts had the effect of limiting the 
natural tendency toward ethical exceptionalism. 
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
One last concern about the Contextual View: ethics is more 
than justice. If Simon is correct that the law's fundamental substan­
tive purpose is justice, and this is law's only fundamental substan­
tive purpose, then I doubt that the Contextual View can serve as a 
complete theory of lawyers' ethics. The Contextual View instructs 
lawyers confronted with ethical problems to be responsive to the 
law, which in the Contextual View ultimately amounts to being 
responsive to justice. But justice is only one ethical end or virtue 
among many. Kindness, benevolence, loyalty, and integrity are 
some of the others. It may well be that these values are not part of 
the law, but it seems strange to exempt lawyers from their com­
mands. Requirements of justice can conflict with requirements of 
kindness, benevolence, loyalty, and integrity. This is not law's 
problem, but it is a problem for ethical theory, which aspires to 
deliver a comprehensive account of what people should do, espe­
cially in situations where genuine values or virtues push in different 
directions. A theory of lawyers' ethics should include this aspira­
tion. If it does not - say, because it restricts the lawyer's ethical 
obligations to a concern for justice - it threatens to portray the 
ethical lawyer as a stunted or fanatical ethical actor, one who 
monomaniacally acts to achieve justice, regardless of sacrificing 
other values and virtues. This might be a slight improvement on the 
Dominant View, according to which the lawyer sacrifices every 
other value and virtue to a peculiarly limited kind of loyalty -
fealty to the client. But it is equally ethically narrow-minded. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, this review may demonstrate that the opinions of 
your admirers can be more of a pain in the neck than the views of 
your detractors. I learned a lot from The Practice of Justice; I 
enjoyed William H. Simon's intelligence, and his book inspired me 
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to think hard. What thanks does Simon get from such a reader? A 
request for a sequel, in which Simon specifies at least some substan­
tive principles of justice lawyers ought to heed, and in which he 
explains whether, and if so why, justice should be the paramount 
consideration in lawyers' ethics. 
